


Turning the valve: Outlook for Russian gas transit via Ukraine

Prepared by GLO Research


November 2024



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- I. Overview of Russian gas flows into Europe and Ukraine transit agreement
- II. Impact on the European supply balance compared to Aurora Central
- III. Knock-on effects around the world

In your view, will an agreement be reached on Ukraine natural gas transit?

% of answers

8%

A. Agreement will be renewed under current terms

45%

B. Agreement reached that allows for daily bookings, but no long-term contract

14%

C. No agreement, all gas flows stop forever

33%

D. No agreement for now, but gas flows restart after the war in Ukraine ends

Once the EU's largest supplier, Russian pipeline gas now accounts for only 8% of imports – a dramatic shift from nearly 50% in 2019

Main Russian gas export routes to Europe^{1,2}
bcm




■ Russian pipeline routes into Europe ■ LNG

1) Shown figures represent annual capacity 2) Includes both currently operational and previously used pipelines

Impact of EU's shift from Russian gas:


- Idle capacity and stranded assets, the prime example being the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. While the pipeline was physically completed it never received the necessary regulatory approval, resulting in substantial sunk costs.
- Russia's strategic leverage and use of pipeline gas as a bargaining tool has diminished.
- International sanctions on Russia limit planned LNG projects, reducing Russia's capacity to redirect its gas to other markets.

Share of Russian pipeline gas in total EU imports




Ending Russian gas transit via Ukraine means halving Russia's remaining pipeline gas exports to Europe

Russian monthly pipeline exports to Europe¹ by main routes



Share of Russian pipeline gas in total European gas imports²



Key recent events


- Gazprom informed Austria's OMV that it will suspend deliveries under its long-term gas contract, following OMV's announcement that it would seek to recover more than €230mn after an arbitration ruling. Flows via Ukraine, however, appeared nearly unchanged.
- SPP (Slovakia) signs pilot short-term supply deal for December deliveries with Azerbaijan's SOCAR.
- Ukraine's energy ministry confirmed that there are no ongoing negotiations on Russian or any other transit through Ukraine.

■ Nord Stream ■ Yamal³ ■ Ukraine⁴ ■ TurkStream ■ Finland + Baltics ■ Russian Pipeline Share


1) Europe includes EU-27, the UK, and Switzerland, but excludes Turkey. 2) The share does not include production and storage withdrawals/injections. 3) Excludes non-Yamal flows from Poland to Belarus. 4) Includes Sokhranovka (until May 2022) and Sudzha entry points.

Europe's LNG imports from Russia have increased, but Western sanctions have slowed buildout and exports from new terminals

Russian monthly LNG imports by selected EU countries



Share of Russian LNG in total EU imports^{1,2}



Belgium France Netherlands Spain Rest of Europe Russian LNG Share

Implications of Western sanctions:

- Ban on transshipment services, aiming to prevent the use of EU facilities as transit for Russian LNG to non-EU destinations.
- Investment and export restrictions limiting the export of services and goods to Russian LNG projects under construction.
- Ban on importing Russian LNG through terminals not connected to the EU natural gas interconnected system.

1) Europe includes EU-27, the UK, and Switzerland, but excludes Turkey. 2) The share does not include storage withdrawals/injections in the supply mix.

Possible pathways for Russian gas transit via Ukraine from 2025



Poll 2:

In case a transit agreement is not reached, what supply source could offset the lost gas:

% of answers


- 27% A. Pipeline supply from Norway, North Africa, and the Southern Gas Corridor (Azerbaijan)
- 8% B. Russian LNG
- 60% C. US LNG
- 5% D. No replacement, resulting in demand destruction

Agenda

- I. The Ukraine transit agreement and overview of Russian gas flows into Europe
- II. Impact on the European supply balance compared to Aurora Central
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If Ukraine gas transit stops on 1 Jan 2025, lost Russian pipeline gas would be largely offset by increased LNG imports

Mid-term changes in European¹ supply balance vs Aurora's Central forecast
bcm




Key changes in European balance

- In our alternative scenario, the loss of transit in 2025 is mainly offset by storage withdrawals and redirected LNG flows
- From 2026 onward, North African pipeline supply partly displaces storage withdrawals
- As new liquefaction projects in the US come online, LNG compensates for reduced pipeline supply from Russia
- Between 2025-2035, we expect LNG to account for 82% of the lost Russian pipeline supply, with North Africa contributing an additional 10%. The remainder is covered by an uptick in domestic production and other sources

1) Europe includes EU-27, the UK, and Switzerland, but excludes Turkey.

Redirecting US LNG from Asia offsets Ukraine transit loss in 2025, with no increase in Norwegian supply


Changes in gas flows by major import sources in 2025 vs Central bcm




- Russia seeks alternative route for its gas through TurkStream route with options of additional gas flowing to Turkey and Southeastern Europe
- Azerbaijan becomes a bigger supplier via TANAP and TAP corridor, supplying 0.44 bcm more than in Central in 2025
- While constrained in 2025, TAP and TANAP undergo capacity expansions of 16 bcm and 10 bcm, respectively, support the corridor's increasing importance
- Production constraints and demand growth in North Africa in 2025 prevent significant additional exports to Europe

Alternative pipeline routes and higher LNG flows via Germany compensate for the loss of Ukraine transit in the mid-term


Selected routes¹ into South and Eastern Europe – changes vs Central



Share of LNG imports by major sources to Europe – changes vs Central



LNG sendout in selected North West Europe countries – changes vs Central




1) TAP=Trans Adriatic Pipeline; North Africa includes Algeria and Libya

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Ending Ukraine transit drives a shift in global LNG flows in 2025, with limited upside for Russia in the mid-term


Changes in global LNG flows in 2025 vs Central¹
bcm



1) Shown LNG balances are for major global exporting countries.

China benefits from access to Russian pipeline gas, while other Asian consumers shift towards the Middle East and Australia


Main gas routes to selected APAC countries^{1,2}
bcm



Key changes

- Imports of US LNG fall by 10.3bcm in 2025, replaced by Australian (+6bcm), Canadian (+2.3bcm), and Middle Eastern (+1.4bcm) LNG
- China benefits from higher pipeline supply in 2027-2035, with additional flows of 4.1bcm/a compared to Oct-24 Central
- India, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan increase LNG imports from the Middle East by 1.8bcm/a in 2025-2035

APAC countries gas balance - change vs Central



■ Pipeline
 ■ Other³
■ Russia LNG
 ■ Australia LNG
 ■ US LNG
 ■ Middle East LNG
 ■ Other LNG

1) Selected APAC countries include China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 2) Power of Siberia 2 and SKV pipelines are planned, the remaining are operational 3) Includes indigenous production and storage 4) Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok pipeline 5) Planned expansion of 30 bcm/a through Line D



Europe has significantly reduced its reliance on Russian pipeline gas, which now represents around 14% of total imports compared to nearly 50% just five years ago



Ending Ukraine gas transit would cut ~50% of the remaining Russian pipeline flows into Europe



Redirected LNG from Asia and strong storage withdrawals can absorb the impact in 2025, with North African pipeline supply and additional US LNG underpinning supply stability in future years



Upside for Russian LNG into Europe remains limited due to the impact of sanctions and will likely find a market for its gas in friendly economies like China and India, as well as domestically

Q&A Session

Details and disclaimer

Date

November 2024

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